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State Aid and City Needs: 
An Examination oj 
Residual State Aid 
to Large Cities 
John P. Pelissero 
Texas A & M University 
Dye and Hurley's (1978) conclusion that the states are somewhat more responsive to city 
needs than the federal government was questioned on methodological grounds by Ward 
(1981). The point of contention was Dye and Hurley's use of per capita measures of 
state/federal aid and urban needs. The research reported here examines state aid to the forty-
seven largest U.S. cities, and employs residual measures of state aid allocations before and 
during the urban crisis. Multiple regression of residual state aid on social, economic, or fiscal 
need indicators shows the states to have been very responsive to city needs over time, and 
lends substantial support to the findings of Dye and Hurley. 
Since the early 1960s cities have encountered a variety of persistent 
problems that remain beyond their own means to resolve. A common 
understanding among policymakers in the federal system is that large 
cities have been unable to provide a smorgasbord of public services and to 
cope with a variety of city problems without assistance from the federal 
and state governments. In the late 1960s the "urban crisis" was recog-
nized and addressed by a host of federal programs. But that situation has 
not gone away. Today the crisis in the cities does not pervade the 
media - it has been replaced by more urgent national and international 
concerns. But the distress of the 1960s and 1970s is very much present in 
large central cities of the 1980s. 
The Reagan administration no longer wants the cities to look to the 
• This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, 20-23 April 1983, in Chicago. I would like to thank David R. 
Morgan for suggesting that I study this policy area and for his assistance and encouragement 
throughout the project. I also want to acknowledge the helpful criticisms and suggestions of 
Michael Cant, F. Ted Hebert, Keith Hamm, Kenneth Meier, Charles Wiggins, and two 
anonymous reviewers. 
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federal government as the "court-of-first-resort" to help resolve their 
problems. This process of direct problem solving through federal fiscal 
assistance may have been necessary in the 1960s, but the current ad-
ministration wishes it to be replaced by other means. The "new" New 
Federalism initiatives that the administration advanced in 1981 included 
a large turnback of federal grant programs to the states. Along with 
some federal dollars to help the states throughout most of this decade, the 
Feds now want the states to become the courts-of-first-resort for the 
resolution of city problems. Among many criticisms of Reagan's New 
Federalism plans, the issue of the states' capacities to respond to urban 
problems has been reised by skeptics. And many city government of-
ficials fear that the states will not be willing to accept the challenges of 
this responsibility. Both concerns have their basis in historical fact: states 
were often the least-prepared level of government to engage in any urban 
problem solving. This paper looks at city problems and the ways that 
states have responded to them during the past two decades. 
A useful dichotomy of the myriad of problems perpetuating the crisis in 
the cities is that offered by Tobin (1979, p. 10). One set of problems is 
local in origin: mismanagement of city governments, inefficiency of 
municipal operations, and outmoded political structures. These are 
"problems of the city," and they may be remedied by the city in many in-
stances. The second set of problems is really a mirror of national prob-
lems that are "centered in the city," such as poverty, crime, and substan-
dard housing. These latter problems are shaped as much by national 
forces as by local conditions. Thus, they frequently are regarded as re-
quiring the assistance of higher-level governments, federal or state, to 
achieve any resolution. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO CITY PROBLEMS 
How have the federal and state governments responded to this need for 
assistance? Until recently not much empirical research had been applied 
to this question. However, in the late 1970s, studies of federal and state 
aid targeting to needy cities became more common. Much of this 
research has concentrated on the federal government's response to urban 
problems. Saltzstein (1977) did a limited comparison of Texas cities' 
federal aid receipts. He found virtually no relationship between federal 
aid and common measures of local social and economic conditions. 
The Saltzstein single-state study was followed by three more broadly 
based cross-sectional research efforts which obtained much different 
results. One, focusing on the needs of major U.S. cities in relationship to 
federal aid allocations, was that of Cuciti (1978). This study, conducted 
for the U.S. House of Representative's Committee on Banking, Finance, 
918 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46,1984 
and Urban Affairs, examined the social, economic, and fiscal needs in 
forty-five large cities. Five different programs of federal aid were found 
to be related to at least one dimension of need in these cities. Contrary to 
this finding, Dye and Hurley (1978) showed that per capita federal spend-
ing (both in total and by selected program) was only weakly related to 
common measures of city need. Additionally, they found that federal 
grants were somewhat less responsive to need than state grant programs. 
Stein (1981a) also examined the relationship between per capita federal 
aid and city needs. Like Cuciti, he found federal aid to be related to cur-
rent need, as well as responsive to changes in city need, fiscal capacity, or 
both (p. 338). 
This growing body of literature on federal aid allocations is being met 
by an enlarging set of studies on state aid targeting. l Dye and Hurley 
(1978, pp. 203-6) looked at state grants and found them to be somewhat 
more responsive to city needs than federal grants. However, their find-
ings have been challenged by Ward (1981) on both methodological and 
theoretical grounds. Ward has objected to Dye and Hurley's use of per 
capita measures of aid. Arguing that total measures of state and federal 
aid do bear strong relationships to the size (rather than proportion) of the 
population in need (p. 87), Ward contends that these authors' conclusions 
are invalid. Ward raises important methodological questions which are 
discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
A study by the National Governors' Association (NGA; 1979) looked at 
both federal and state aid to distressed cities. Emphasizing the impor-
tance of funneling all federal aid for cities through the states, the report 
analyzed the impact of federal and state aid upon four indicators of city 
hardship, as explored in previous studies (Nathan and Adams, 1976; 
Cuciti, 1978). The NGA study concluded that responsiveness to city 
problems is best met by a combination of federal and state aid. From a 
somewhat self-serving perspective, it urged the federal government not to 
bypass the states when attempting to assist distressed cities. Because the 
states are closer to the needy communities, the governors' report sug-
gested, the states could assemble a better aid package for cities with the 
help of federal monies. In general, the NGA study lends support to the 
findings of Dye and Hurley. 
Further support for these findings appears in two related analyses of 
state aid to cities by Stein (1981b, 1982). Focusing on per capita state aid 
to cities in relation to multiple indicators of social and fiscal need, Stein 
found state aid (in a pooled sample of cities) was responsive to measures of 
need. However, an important caveat was that this finding did not hold 
I For example, see the special issue of The Urban Interest 3 (1981) on "Targeting State and 
Federal Resources to Urban Areas," edited by Vincent L. Marando and Ulf Zimmerman. 
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true across all states. Emphasizing that there are fifty separate and 
distinct state aid systems, Stein subsequently analyzed the targeting of aid 
in each of the states and concluded that only a handful of states were ac-
tually good targeters of aid. As a result, Stein noted that the findings of 
such studies as Dye and Hurley and NGA were misleading. The overall 
positive responsiveness to need was likely to have resulted from the actions 
of those few states which are "consistent targeters" of their needier cities 
(Stein, 1981b, pp. 53-55). 
Measuring State Aid. 
Studies of state aid have shared one commonality - most of the data on 
state aid allocations have been in per capita form. Dye and Hurley, 
NGA, and Stein all relied upon per capita measures of aid in their 
analyses. Ward (1981) raised important questions about using per capita 
figures in such research, and he drew upon issues raised by Uslaner (1976) 
to make his arguments. Yet, if one relies upon total measures of state aid 
and the total level of need (rather than percentage in need), one runs the 
risk of confirming the obvious. That is, total state aid (state spending) is 
strongly related to the size of the city's population. An alternative 
method to measuring state aid is explained below. 
Uslaner's (1976) critique of per capita measures in regression analysis 
demands that researchers consider the theoretical relevance of per capita 
dependent and independent variables before employing them. His con-
cern rests upon the ideas advanced by Cortes and Przeworski (1971) 
which suggest that the theoretically meaningful variables (in such areas as 
state expenditure analysis) are the total figure - not per capita transfor-
mations. As Uslaner notes, "State legislators generally deal in absolute 
dollar and cent terms when deciding the level of state expenditures. There 
is no evidence that the expenditures of other states serve as a baseline for 
any individual state" (1976, p. 131). The only theoretically justified use 
of per capita transformations, according to Uslaner, is in comparing cases 
on indicators such as relative deprivation, or when one has information 
that the per capita measures were used in the policymaking process. 
Uslaner's argument and his empirical results raise important questions 
for those who study state and urban policy. If per capita measures are in-
appropriate, "nonlinear transformations of the original data" (Uslaner, 
1976, p. 126), then the more common alternative would be to employ the 
total figures. This is suggested by Ward (1981) in his examination of Dye 
and Hurley's (1978) measurement of state and federal responses to urban 
needs. Ward shows that per capita measures may distort policy analysis 
by indicating that there is a negative or weak association between per 
capita federal aid outlays and percent needy when the correlation be-
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tween total outlay and number in need is actually quite strong and 
positive (pp. 85-87). He does note that the latter finding is somewhat ex-
pected since many commonly employed need measures (e.g., elderly, 
poor population) are also strongly correlated with city population. 
Thus we return to the very concern that lead Dye and Hurley as well as 
other policy researchers to use per capita measures in studying respon-
siveness to need. That is, one finds that larger cities receive more 
state/federal aid because they are larger. An alternative approach is to 
concentrate the policy analysis on that portion of state aid not determined 
by the population of the receiving jurisdiction. As explained below, this 
method should satisfy the concerns of both Uslaner and Ward while 
avoiding the pitfalls of confirming the obvious relationship between size 
of city and size of outlay. By regressing total state aid figures on city 
population one can produce residuals that are both useful measures of 
state aid and improvements over per capita transformations. 
In a practical sense, the confounding effects of population should be 
removed from the state aid measure. This assumes that state 
aid = j(population) + error. Recognizing this, previous policy 
analyses have controlled for population differences by employing per 
capita measures. But through the method suggested here, the population 
effects are removed in a linear fashion and residual state aid measures that 
are independent of population are produced (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 
1970, pp. 38-39). The residuals represent that portion of state aid money 
allocated on bases other than the size of the receiving city. Most decisions 
about public revenues are political decisions. Thus, the residual portion 
may include political considerations, as well as city needs or other factors 
important to state legislators. 
Residual measures, it can be argued, are better than per capita 
measures for several reasons. First, while per capita measures are pro-
duced by nonlinear transformations, residual measures are derived from a 
linear transformation that makes them well suited for use in subsequent 
analyses with the general linear model.2 Second, residuals are considered 
to be independent of the predictor used to produce them. That is, the 
general linear model assumes that residuals will be uncorrelated with 
population and, therefore, independent of this predictor (Kmenta, 1971, 
pp. 201-5; Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1970, pp. 152-53). One can test 
empirically for independence by calculating the zero-order correlation 
between population and residuals. Independence can be demonstrated if 
2 Uslaner (1976) has adequately discussed and criticized the nonlinear transformations 
that yield per capita measures. Residuals are appropriate to use in the general linear model 
because they should meet the basic assumptions of the regression model (Kmenta, 1971, p. 
202), particularly those of normality, zero means, and independence. 
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this correlation equals (or nearly equals) 0 (see the research design section 
below). 
Third, residual measures allow the policy researcher to concentrate on 
the discretionary portion of state aid allocations and to draw conclusions 
from this analysis about the importance of needs, politics, and other fac-
tors. There is less certainty, when employing per capita measures, that 
only the nonpopulation-determined portion of an outlay is being exam-
ined. 
Finally, residual analysis allows the calculation of residual independent 
variables as well as dependent (state aid) variables. In this policy area, 
the independent variables used as predictors of state aid are indicators of 
city need or distress. Producing residual need measures is important in 
state aid analyses since many indicators of city need used as predictors of 
state aid are also strongly correlated with population (Ward, 1981). 
In sum, the employment of a residual measure offers significant advan-
tages to policy researchers which are not present in the use of per capita 
transformations. A more theoretically relevant measure is produced 
which should allow for a more accurate assessment of state aid policies. 
Explaining S~ate Aid Outputs 
Several explanations for the distribution of this residual state aid seem 
plausible. For example, we might consider the very factors that have 
been empirically linked with state spending. The capacity of the state 
fiscal system might explain the residual allocation to cities. States with 
stronger revenue capacities may be in a better position to send additional 
money to cities beyond that which might correspond to a city's fair share 
in terms of population. Despite the current revenue constraints confront-
ing many states due to national or regional economic conditions, the states 
have improved their revenue capacities in recent years to respond to com-
munities that have more distress than others (see the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981a, pp. 33-35; 1981b; 1981c; 
Lawson and Stenberg, 1982; and Cohen, 1982). 
A second possible explanation involves the legal/structural relationship 
between a state and its cities (Morgan and England, forthcoming). States 
with more decentralized arrangements for the provision of services may 
be expected to give more money to cities than states of a highly centralized 
structure. Support for this hypothesis is found in the research of Stephens 
and Olson (1979; also, Stephens, 1974). Although they examine state and 
local rather than state and city financial relationships, their finding that 
centralized states tend to "give less money to their local entities than those 
with decentralized arrangements" (1979, p. 59) has application to cities as 
well. 
Several state political factors may also be considered as potential 
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stimuli of residual state aid. State-level forces behind the political ex-
planation may include interparty competition (Cnudde and McCrone, 
1969; Sharkansky and Hofferbert, 1969; Carmines, 1974; and Tompkins, 
1975), legislative professionalism (Grumm, 1971; Carmines, 1974), or the 
policy innovativeness of the state (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; and Savage, 
1978). Another important political factor may be the degree of urban-
rural conflict in the legislature. States with strong urban interests in the 
legislature may be expected to produce more prourban legislation, in-
cluding intergovernmental aid for cities. Other state-level explanations 
are the socioeconomic characteristics of states-such as size, metropolitan 
population size, rate of growth, or regional location. 
A final consideration may be the level of need in a community. When 
all other factors are ruled out, it seems entirely plausible that city distress 
ought to be the most relevant variable in state aid allocations. The focus 
of this research is on the degree to which the level of need in communities 
is determinant of residual state aid receipts. 
Sample Considerations 
One feature that is not common among the studies of state aid is sample 
size. Dye and Hurley looked at 243 central cities of Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA). The NGA report was based upon 
data from fifty-nine selected central cities, while Stein analyzed 845 cities 
with populations of 25,000 and above. There appears to be some basis 
for focusing a study of city need or distress on a sample of large cities. 
For example, Netzer (1970) suggested that the concentration of poverty 
and racial problems, physical deterioration, and imbalances between 
service demands and tax resources were most severe in the largest central 
cities (populations of 500,000 or more) in the U.S. While tax bases were 
deteriorating in large cities, especially in the Northeast and Midwest, 
spending (per capita) increased by a faster rate in the twenty-eight largest 
cities than in all local governments from 1962 to 1972 (Peterson, 1976, p. 
41). Between one-quarter and one-third of the poor in the U.S. resided 
in the nation's central cities from 1959 into the 1970s (Gorham and 
Glazer, 1976, p. 21) - a proportion that grew larger in later years. 
In addition, several studies of city problems have substantiated the 
acute distress in the largest U.S. cities. Nathan and Adams (1976) found 
significant problems in more than half of the fifty-five largest central 
cities studied. Analyses of fiscal problems in large city samples of forty 
(Schmid et aI., 1975) and thirty (Dearborn, 1977) communities each 
disclosed serious fiscal needs among large municipalities. Bunce (1976) 
examined needs in cities of different sizes and confirmed that greater need 
for community development-related policies existed in the largest north-
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eastern, midwestern, and southern cities. Finally, Cuciti's (1978) 
research for the U.S. House of Representatives was focused on forty-five 
of the largest cities. She found "above average" problems on different 
dimensions related to social, fiscal, or economic need in most of the cities. 
The weight of this empirical research suggests that major problems 
associated with the urban crisis were quite serious in the largest U.S. 
cities. 
Further, one could argue that the states should be more aware of prob-
lems in their larger cities. Teitelbaum, Arnold, and Lyttle (1981) suggest 
that key state officia.ls might be "more cognizant of the needs of their 
larger cities." Such an assertion can be supported by the types of infor-
mation available to state officials about cities. Most of the media centers 
are located in the states' largest cities - focusing on both national and 
metropolitan news. Governors have begun to establish liaison or 
"regional" offices in large cities. Metropolitan representatives now 
dominate many state legislatures. Finally, state departments of com-
munity affairs, advisory commissions on intergovernmental relations, and 
other state-local bodies provide current information on urban 
needs - including major city needs - to state officials (Advisory Commis-
sion, 1981c). Together, these information sources keep governors, 
legislatures, and agencies aware of major city problems. 
Empirical support for the suggestion that more attention is given to 
large cities is also available. For example, Sharkansky's (1975) analysis of 
state and federal aid to cities revealed that states were giving almost three 
times as much aid to cities of over 500,000 than was the federal govern-
ment. And "the states are giving the greatest aid to the largest cities, and 
are increasing most the aid to those cities. From 1964-65 to 1972-73 
state aid per capita to cities over 500,000 population increased by 270 per-
cent, while per capita aid to other cities increased by 211 percent" (p. 92). 
In summary, three issues appear to be important to understanding the 
relationship between state aid and city need. First, one would do well to 
analyze state-level as well as city-level variables in seeking to explain state 
aid responsiveness to urban needs. This approach was used by Morgan 
and England (forthcoming). Second, one's choice of sample should con-
sider groups of cities with more severe problems that might be expected to 
evoke some state response. But the most critical factor to address is the 
proper way to measure state intergovernmental aid to cities. The 
analysis described below concentrates on the residual portion of state aid 
which is unrelated to city population size. Thus, this study looks beyond 
the fair-share allocation to the part of state aid that may be determined by 
consideration of differential needs in cities. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
The analysis that follows is an examination of residual state aid to 
cities. The hypothesis is that residual state aid expenditures to cities are 
largely determined by city needs. The research question addressed is: 
how responsive is residual state aid to city needs? More specifically, how 
important are measures of city need in the determination of residual state 
aid monies? The second question to be examined is: what aspects of city 
need are most strongly linked to residual state aid received? The final 
issue to be addressed is: has the importance of city needs in determining 
residual state aid chaqged over time? 
Sample 
The units of analysis in this study are cities - the forty-seven largest 
U.S. cities with 1970 populations of at least 300,000 (see Appendix).3 This 
group of large cities is similar to samples used in several analyses men-
tioned above, particularly those of Nathan and Adams (1976) and Cuciti 
(1978). Such a sample gives attention to cities with empirically 
documented distress and to the major urban population and problem 
centers in states. 
The analysis takes place for two time periods-1962 and 1976. The 
first point was chosen because, although problems were beginning to 
develop in cities at this time, the importance of the problems had not yet 
caused policymakers in state capitals - but more particularly in 
Washington - to begin funneling massive aid monies to cities. Also, the 
early 1960s was a period when states were considered to be the "weak 
sister" in the intergovernmental picture (Martin, 1965, p. 77; Sundquist, 
1969, pp. 261-66). The choice of 1962 as the first point of analysis is pur-
posely intended to reflect the condition of state aid to cities at a time when 
states were not thought to be attuned to urban affairs. The second time 
point, fifteen years later, was selected to allow for an examination of the 
states' responses to the urban crisis. A basic assumption here is that a 
significant change would have taken place from that observed in 1962. 
This change is one that could be attributable to the heightened emphasis 
on the urban crisis. 
Measures of State Aid 
The dependent variables include total intergovernmental revenue from 
state government received by the sample cities in 1962 and 1976. 4 As 
3 Washington, D.C. is not included among the largest cities because it is not a political 
subdivision of a state. 
4 The revenue data are drawn from U.S. Bureau of the Census, City GO(;Cnlll!ellt 
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reported by the Census Bureau, this measure includes state grants-in-aid, 
state-city revenue sharing, reimbursements, and payments in lieu of 
taxes. The state aid data also include federal pass-through aid. Most of 
the pass-through money goes to support local education and welfare pro-
grams. 5 Few cities included in the sample receive large amounts of 
federal pass-through funds because school districts or county governments 
are generally the recipients of school and welfare money, respectively. A 
small number of cities in this sample do receive large amounts of educa-
tion and welfare pass-through funds (e.g., New York). The inclusion of 
data on these few cities is not expected to be problematic in the analysis 
that follows. 
Accepting the arguments of Uslaner (1976) and Ward (1981) on the use 
of per capita measures, regression is employed here to produce residuals of 
state aid. Preliminary analysis of the data in this study showed a simple 
correlation between total state aid received and city population of .90 in 
1962 and .88 in 1976. (Both correlations were significant below .001.) 
These correlations suggest that 81 percent of state aid received in 1962 
and 77 percent of that in 1976 could be explained by city population 
alone. As previously addressed, the alternative to per capita methods for 
achieving a population adjustment is made possible with regression. This 
will allow the researcher to focus on the 19-23 percent of state aid that is 
determined by factors other than population. To produce residual 
measures the 1962 state aid data were regressed on the 1960 city popula-
tion, while the 1976 data were similarly regressed on the 1975 population. 
The resulting residuals are then employed as the dependent variables in 
this study. The residuals for both years were found to meet the test of in-
dependence through a correlation of each with population. The simple 
correlation between residual aid and population was - .008 for 1962 and 
- .009 for 1976. 
Measures oj City Need 
Following previous research, the conceptual use of need in this study 
follows the notion of three dimensions: social need, economic need, and 
fiscal need. Social needs are the problems of people in the city. The 
dimension includes problems related to poverty, crime, dependency (e.g., 
elderly), and so forth. The economic health of an area, or the second 
Finances in 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), table 7; and City 
Government Finances in 1975-76 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 
table 7. 
5 For example, in 1976-77 the total federal pass-through money to local governments was 
$12.3 billion. Out of this total $10.1 billion, or 82.1 percent, went to support local education 
and welfare. 
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dimension, considers such conditions as home ownership, density of the 
city population, and business health indicators. The fiscal need dimen-
sion taps the financial health or stress of city governments. This factor 
includes such items as deficit spending and city service responsibilities. 
Several indicators have been chosen for each need dimension. Because 
of the relative importance of the needs of people, more measures of the 
social dimension have been included. Just as the choice of using total or 
per capita measures has been an issue, so too has the form of the indepen-
dent variables (Ward, 1981). Initially, the decision was made to employ 
the actual size of the population in need, rather than using the percentage 
of it. However, as would be expected, population-related measures of 
social need were found to be strongly associated with city population. To 
achieve indicators of social need which would not be tied to population, 
the social need measures were all regressed on population (for the ap-
propriate year). The residuals generated are measures of social need 
which are linearly adjusted for population. The indicators of social need 
include: (1) nonwhite residual (minority population 1960, 1970); (2) 
elderly residual (1960, 1970); (3) poverty residual (1960, 1969); (4) 
mobility residual (population moving in previous five years, 1960, 1970); 
(5) unemployment residual (1962, 1976); and (6) crime residual (serious 
crimes reported 1960, 1975). All of the social need measures are 
hypothesized to be positively related to residual state aid. Two measures 
were chosen for the economic need dimension: (1) density (population per 
square mile 1960, 1975), expected to be positively associated with aid; 
and (2) home ownership (total owner-occupied housing 1960, 1970), an-
ticipated to be negatively related to aid. Finally, the fiscal need dimen-
sion is represented by four indicators of the financial health and stress of 
city governments: (1) budget deficit (general fund deficit spending total, 
1962, 1976); (2) debt burden (total general debt as a proportion of general 
revenue in 1962, 1976); (3) fiscal effort (general revenue/personal income, 
1962, 1976); and (4) functional inclusiveness (city responsibility for 
education and/or welfare services, 1962, 1976).6 All of the fiscal need in-
dicators should show positive associations with residual state aid. 
ANALYSIS 
Table 1 reports the bivariate correlations between the three types of 
need measures and state aid in 1962 and 1976. Two social need in-
dicators were strongly related to residual state aid in 1962 - nonwhite 
6 Similar to that suggested by Liebert (1974), the functional inclusiveness indicator is a 
measure of the functional responsibilities of city governments. It is coded as follows: 0 - no 
city welfare or education responsibility; 1-either responsibility; and 2 - responsibility for 
both functions. This is a measure of city spending responsibility for these two services. 
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( - .50) and mobility ( - .72). Although the negative correlations appear 
to suggest that higher state aid payments were observed in cities with 
lesser social needs, the signs lack substantive interpretation in analyzing 
residual social needs and residual state aid. The signs changed as a result 
of the residualization process that produced the new variables and are 
statistical artifacts of the procedure. 7 Residual aid was positively cor-
related with three other measures of social need - elderly, poverty, and 
crime- but none was significant in 1962. Neither of the economic ne~d 
TABLE 1 
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESIDUAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
AID FROM STATE GOVERNMENT AND CITY NEED INDICATORS 
INDICATORS OF NEED 
Social Need 
Nonwhite Residual 
Elderly Residual 
Poverty Residual 
Mobility Residual 
Crime Residual 
Unemployment Residual 
Economic Need 
Density 
Home Ownership 
Fiscal Need 
N 
Budget Deficit 
Debt Burden 
Fiscal Effort 
Functional Inclusiveness 
1962 
- .50-
.24 
.23 
-.72* 
.24 
.07 
- .18 
.07 
.37* 
.54' 
44 
YEAR 
1976 
-.33-
.56-
.33* 
-.68-
.10 
-.32-
.12 
-.28* 
.18 
.45-
.43-
47 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1962, 1972, 1977 edi-
tions; City Government Finances, 1962 and 1975-76 editions; Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, Crime in the U.S., 1962 and 1975 editions. 
* p ,,; .05. 
7 For additional explanation, note that both the dependent variable, state aid, and the in-
dependent variables representing social needs (i.e., nonwhite and mobility) are residual 
variables not "totals" or the size of the social indicator. The original variables, when cor-
related, displayed positive correlations with one another. In other words, total state aid and 
the size of the nonwhite (or mobile) population were positively correlated with one another. 
But in several analyses the residual variables for aid and social need showed negative correla-
tions. There is no substantive or theoretical explanation for this observation. The changes in 
sign are statistical artifacts of the residuals procedure in regression analysis. For this reason, 
the direction of the relationship between social need variables and the dependent variable is 
not discussed in the paper. 
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variables correlated highly with aid in this year. But two of the four 
fiscal need measures did correlate in a moderately strong, positive 
fashion. Functional inclusiveness had the second strongest correlation 
among all need measures (.54), while fiscal effort showed a somewhat 
smaller (.37), although still significant association. 
Some support is found in table 1 for the hypothesis that city needs 
should have been more strongly related to residual state aid in 1976 than 
in 1962. By 1976 many states had reformed their government structures 
to improve their capacity to respond to city problems. In addition, the 
urban crisis that was going unnoticed in national and state legislative 
circles in 1962 was weB beyond the point of discovery by 1976. This fact 
lends support to the presumption that a change in state aid to cities should 
be noticeable in the second time period. There were five significant cor-
relations between residual state aid and social need indicators in 1976. 
Mobility (- .68) and nonwhite (- .33) were again significant, although 
the strength of the relationships had dropped slightly from the 1962 obser-
vations. The three social need indicators that increased in the level of 
association by 1976 were elderly (.56), poverty (.33), and unemployment 
(- .32). One economic need variable was found to be significantly 
related to residual aid in 1976: home ownership ( - .28). This was also an 
increase in the level of association from that observed in 1962. Finally, 
the same two fiscal need measures were found to be correlated in a 
moderately strong way with 1976 residual aid. While the measure of 
fiscal effort increased in strength (.45) in the latter period, the functional 
inclusiveness indicator was down slightly (.43) from 1962. Overall, 
though, more measures of need were found to be associated with residual 
state aid in 1976 than in the first year studied. 
State Aid to Cities in 1962 
Not all variables contained in table 1 could be used in the multivariate 
analysis that follows. First, there was a multicollinearity problem be-
tween two of the fiscal need indicators: fiscal effort and functional in-
clusiveness in 1962 correlated at .88. Second, some of the independent 
variables displayed virtually no association with the dependent measure 
of residual state aid in table 1. To ascertain the actual level of impor-
tance of each of the independent variables in the determination of 
residual state aid, a stepwise multiple regression procedure was 
employed. The following tables display only those variables that made a 
significant contribution to explained variance in this analysis. The in-
dependent variables are ordered according to the step in which they were 
added to the equation. 
As can be seen in table 2, mobility was the most important predictor of 
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TABLE 2 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CITY RESIDUAL 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REVENUE FROM STATE GOVERNMENT 
BY NEED VARIABLES, 1962 
PREDICTORS 
Mobility Residual 
Nonwhite Residual 
Fiscal Effort 
Home Ownership 
Constant 
R = .89 
R2 = .79 
F = 35.41 
• Unstandardized regression coefficient. 
Ba 
-.482 
- .418 
9.797 
-.000 
-.493 
, Standardized regression coefficient (beta weight). 
COEFFICIENTS 
BETA' 
-.484 
-.404 
.359 
-.183 
929 
j-value 
33.33 
26.60 
19.54 
5.35 
residual state aid (Beta = - .484). The second most important predic-
tor, nonwhite, was also a social need indicator and had a similarly high 
standardized regression coefficient (Beta = - .404). These two predic-
tors were followed in step 3 of the analysis by fiscal effort (Beta = .359). 
Cities making better fiscal efforts appear to have increased their residual 
state aid by much more than cities with lower fiscal effort (b = 9.797). 
Finally, home ownership was the last variable to enter the equation with 
a significant regression coefficient (Beta = - .183). This combination 
c~ social, economic, and fiscal predictors resulted in a significantly high 
multiple correlation coefficient of .89 and an exceptionally high explained 
variance of 79 percent. It is significant that fully 79 percent of the varia-
tion in residual state aid receipts among these cities was explained by 
these measures of city need. 
To see if the results would differ when fiscal effort was replaced with 
the functional inclusiveness measure, the latter variable was used as a 
predictor in a subsequent analysis. The results, shown in table 3, in-
dicate that once again mobility and nonwhite are the more important 
predictors of residual state aid. The functional responsibility measure of 
city education and/or welfare responsibilities entered the equation third 
(Beta = .373), as did the fiscal effort variable in table 2. Although home 
ownership dropped out of this equation due to a lack of statistical 
significance, the two social need variables plus the fiscal need predictor 
do nearly as well as the four predictors in table 2. The multiple correla-
tion coefficient in this latter analysis is still very high (.88), and the three 
variables explain 78 percent of the variability in residual state aid receipts 
in the sample cities. Overall, the results of the 1962 analysis indicate that 
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TABLE 3 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CITY RESIDUAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
REVENUE FROM STATE GOVERNMENT BY SOCIAL NEED RESIDUALS 
AND FUNCTIONAL INCLUSIVENESS, 1962 
PREDICTORS 
Mobility Residual 
Nonwhite Residual 
Functional Inclusiveness 
Constant 
R = .88 
R2 = .78 
F = 46.74 
" Unstandardized regression coefficient. 
B" 
-.543 
-.373 
.551 
-.209 
b Standardized regression coefficient (beta weight). 
COEFFICIENTS 
BETAb 
-.544 
-.374 
.373 
j-value 
47.51 
24.17 
23.23 
needs were very important in the determination of residual state aid in 
this year. In fact, the need measures account for all but about 20 percent 
of the variability in residual state aid in 1962 - a rather small proportion 
of unexplained variance. 
State Aid to Cities in 1976 
The same stepwise process was used in the analysis of 1976 residual 
state aid. The intercollinearity between fiscal effort and functional in-
clusiveness was again high in this period (r = .80). The analysis was 
tried with each of the fiscal need measures employed in separate analyses, 
but the resultant coefficients were so similar that only one of these prod-
ucts is displayed below. In table 4 the social need variables are, again, 
found to be the stronger determinants of residual state aid. Mobility was 
the strongest predictor (Beta = -.705) and entered in the first step. 
Nonwhite entered on step 2, followed by fiscal effort in the third step. 
Crime, a social need measure, and density, an indicator of economic 
need, followed into the equation in that order. This combination of 
three social, one fiscal, and one economic need predictors achieved a 
significantly high multiple correlation coefficient (.95) and accounted for 
fully 90 percent of the variation in residual state aid. 
It is interesting to observe that only 10 percent of variation in residual 
state aid for 1976 is not determined by the three dimensions of need. This 
suggests that only a very small amount of residual state aid is determined 
by factors not related to city conditions. Another noteworthy finding is 
the greater importance of needs in this equation than in those analyzed 
for 1962. Much more of the variation is explained by needs in the latter 
period - after the urban crisis had been "discovered" and states had ini-
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tiated reforms in their governmental structures to accommodate urban 
concerns - than in the pre-urban crisis period. This finding lends sup-
port to the assumption made earlier that residual state aid would be more 
responsive to measures of city need in 1976. 
TABLE 4 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR CITY RESIDUAL 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REVENUE FROM ST ATE 
GOVERNMENT BY NEED VARIABLES, 1976 
PREDICTORS 
Mobility Residual 
Nonwhite Residual 
Fiscal Effort 
Crime Residual 
Density 
Constant 
R = .95 
R2 = .90 
F = 63.80 
a V nstandardized regression coefficient. 
Ba 
-.711 
-.484 
7.035 
1.042 
-.000 
-.123 
" Standardized regression coefficient (beta weight). 
DISCUSSION 
COEFFICIENTS 
BETA" 
-.705 
-.462 
.564 
.257 
-.400 
j-value 
140.21 
71.40 
49.52 
21.55 
26.33 
This study began with the basic hypothesis that residual state aid is 
largely determined by city needs. The hypothesis was examined in rela-
tion to three research questions. First, how responsive is residual state 
aid to city needs? The evidence from this research suggests that such aid 
is very responsive to some common indicators of city need. A combina-
tion of social and fiscal need measures explained nearly 80 percent of 
residual state aid receipts in 1962. A similar group of social, economic, 
and fiscal need measures accounted for 90 percent of aid variation in 
1976. One may reasonably conclude from these findings that state aid 
programs have been responsive to city needs throughout the period. 
A second question deals with the relative impact of the three need 
dimensions in explaining residual state aid. It seems safe to conclude that 
the social need dimension was the most important aspect of need among 
the three factors examined. At least two social need predictors were 
found to be salient in each equation, and in all cases the social need 
measures were the strongest predictors of residual state aid during the 
years examined. Fiscal need predictors seem to have less but still signifi-
cant importance, especially in light of the contributions of both fiscal ef-
fort and functional inclusiveness in 1962 and 1976. The economic need 
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dimension was found to be the weakest in all equations. This may be due 
to the fewer number of indicators employed in the analysis compared 
with the other dimensions. Since the social need indicators tap the needs-
of-people concept, and since the best representation of Tobin's (1979) no-
tion of problems centered in the city may be social needs, it is perhaps fit-
ting that states should be more responsive to this dimension. 
The final question focuses on the possible changes in the importance of 
needs over time. Needs were clearly important in the 1962 residual state 
aid receipts. This observation is somewhat surprising since states were 
not thought to be very responsive to urban concerns in the early 1960s. 
During this period, the federal government was just beginning to create 
large assistance programs for cities. States were still seen as the weak 
sister in the intergovernmental picture, and cities very frequently turned 
to Washington for help with problems. But despite the historical facts, 
states apparently did a fairly decent job of considering needs in the 
residual aid examined here. By 1976, state governments were even more 
responsive to city needs as measured by the larger explained variation in 
that year's analysis. This may have resulted from improved state govern-
ment structures (including many recently established departments of 
Community or Urban Affairs), increased representation of urban areas 
following reapportionment, and heightened awareness in state capitals of 
the plight of large cities. 
The results of this analysis are the strongest findings yet in support of 
the positive role played by the states in helping city governments. The 
findings lend support to the works of Dye and Hurley (1978), the National 
Governors' Association (1979), and Stein (1981b, 1982), which suggest 
that states have been responsive to city needs. 
While this research has looked at only one aspect of state respon-
siveness - targeting aid to urban needs - the findings have policy implica-
tions for cities. As addressed earlier, Reagan's New Federalism proposals 
have been a source of concern to city governments that have not viewed 
state government to be a good targeter of aid. The new administrative 
mechanisms of New Federalism, along with smaller federal outlays, give 
targeting additional meaning. State targeting will be very important to 
needy cities that may get larger outlays. But at the same time, smaller 
and less needy cities may suffer with smaller outlays due to state 
targeting. All this considered, if the findings reported here for 1962 and 
1976 continue into the 1980s, then cities may enjoy a sense of optimism (if 
the resources are available) about state responsiveness to their problems. 
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ApPENDIX 
SAMPLE CITIES AND RESIDUALS FOR STATE AID, 1962, 1976 (N = 47) 
CITY RESIDUALS 
1962 1976 
Atlanta -0.052665 0.222462 
Baltimore 1.448543 0.739595 
Birmingham 0.172286 0.424731 
Boston 0.994821 0.252000 
Buffalo 0.304440 0.526739 
Chicago -3.692543 -3.595144 
Cincinnati 0.084595 0.388359 
Cleveland -0.379636 -0.085000 
Columbus, OH 0.200673 0.057511 
Dallas -0.371952 -0.392765 
Denver 0.462201 0.236433 
Detroit -0.918175 -0.928426 
EI Paso n.a. 0.248275 
Ft. Worth 0.132223 0.292816 
Honolulu 0.515244 -0.211323 
Houston -0.774442 -1.173084 
Indianapolis 0.043367 -0.088067 
Jacksonville, FL 0.373316 0.067753 
Kansas City, MO -0.021300 0.136775 
Long Beach 0.222357 0.358492 
Los Angeles -2.606741 -3.048308 
Louisville 0.088071 0.360995 
Memphis 0.311751 0.057134 
Miami n.a. 0.317831 
Milwaukee 0.144274 0.027745 
Minneapolis 0.052721 0.339365 
Nashville 0.552586 0.279392 
Newark 0.251525 0.747812 
New Orleans -0.062402 0.069533 
New York 2.882318 3.003731 
Norfolk 0.441744 0.552895 
Oakland 0.189179 0.367913 
Oklahoma City 0.212340 0.291048 
Omaha 0.239467 0.293244 
Philadelphia -1.996730 -1.587506 
Phoenix 0.444172 -0.079462 
Pittsburgh -0.160248 0.172931 
Portland 0.171460 0.320251 
St. Louis -0.406380 0.104532 
St. Paul 0.389939 0.456875 
San Antonio -0.199943 -0.331036 
San Diego -0.077163 -0.149104 
San Francisco 0.456781 0.026355 
San Jose n.a. 0.035464 
Seattle 0.024870 0.145742 
Toledo 0.286372 0.299679 
Tulsa 0.295231 0.341039 
